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1975

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRIGUAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
. vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A. ,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No. 13725

vs.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

DON ALLEN, dba MOUNT NEBO CATTLE
COMPANY,
Intervenor, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

FILED
MAY 5-1975

vs.
J.B.J. FEEDYARDS, INC., a corporation; JOSEPH FORD & SONS, a
partnership; JAMES K. FORD, WILLIAM
FORD and WILLIAM G. BOSWELL,

"ciw'CSupw"" Court, Utah

Involuntary Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. respectfully petitions
the Court to grant a rehearing in the above-entitled matter. The
grounds for such rehearing are argued more fully in the attached
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing, but may be summarized
as follows:
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The Court erred in concluding that the trial court's
findings were supported by substantial evidence with respect to:
(a)

The finding that 272 animals which had been attached

by FIRST SECURITY*BANK belonged to intervenor;
(b)

The finding that the cattle in question were re-

ceived by Mr. GARTH BOSWELL as agent for the intervenor; and
(c)

The finding that ownership of the animals

in question did not pass to J.B.J. FEEDYARDS.
DATED this ~ \ • '

day of May, 1975.
RAY, QUINNEY .& NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84111

By

.-- rvi-^.- ^^//£{c,

.,

Don B. Allen
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
ON KEY ISSUES WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A.

INTERVENOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PARTICULAR CATTLE
INISSUE'WERE UNDER HIS OWNERSHIP.
Appellant can here focus on certain facts in the record or

the absence of other material facts without lengthy argument. Appellant strongly urges that the Court reconsider its prior opinon
by recognizing that intervenor did not present any material evidence
in supporting the lower court finding that the specific animals in
question here remained under his ownership.

The only direct testi-

mony of Intervenor on the question consisted of his identification
of certain brands and a few animals which he recognized as coming
from some neighbors in Montana (Tr. 520, 1.2 and 521, 1. 22). This
is so patently an unreliable conclusion because nearly all of the
cattle which had been purchased by J.B.J. FEEDYARDS had come from
intervener's purchases in Montana, and totaled approximately 3,200
head between April, 1972 and January, 1973 (Exh. 74 and Tr. 759).
It is only logical that some of the cattle remaining at the time
of the dispute herein arose were cattle bearing brands recognized
by intervenor.

Yet, he admitted that during 1972 he sold some

20,000 or 25,000 cattle and that he could not identify specific
brands or specific cattle as having been shipped before or after
January 1, 1973 (Tr. 509, 1.11 and 510, 1.19).

This is very
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critical!

If intervenor could not identify the cattle in question

as having been shipped after January 1, 1973 for his MOUNT NEBO
cattle operation, then the cattle must of necessity have been cattle
which were shipped earlier for J.B.J. FEEDYARDS.

Intervenor did

not introduce one shred of documentary evidence by which he could
trace the 275 attached cattle here under consideration to any shipments he made for his own account.

Appellant respectfully urges

that the total lack of evidence demonstrating that intervenor
could relate his own shipment to the cattle sold by the parties
pending this action requires that intervener's case fall.
Appellant had some affirmative evidence before the Court
which, in any event, completely dispelled any notion that the attached cattle were those of intervenor.

The Court must review

again the impact of Exhibit 86 (received Tr. 864, 1.5). That exhibit is the sum total of all records produced in discovery proceedings by intervenor and respondent relating to shipment by intervenor for his MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY operation after January 1,
1973.

Hoping to render unnecessary the painstaking comparison

by the Court, Appellant and its counsel made a meticulous comparison
of the brands.from the cattle admittedly shipped by intervenor
against brands on the attached cattle here in dispute (shown on
Exhibit 11). Out of 267 head of cattle attached, only 12 animals
had brands from Montana which duplicated any brands taken from

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

intervener's animals

shown on Exhibit 86.

In the face of such

eivdence, we submit that the Court cannot believe the findings
of the lower court supported by substantial evidence.

The 12

animals which do have similar brands are described on pages 59
and 60 of Appellant's original brief and that description will not
be repeated here.

But we must emphasize that such evidence is uncon-

troverted and results in the inescapable conclusion that not more
thai 12 attached animals could have belonged to intervenor (and
those were not necessarily his, in view of the many Montana-originated
shipments for J.B.J, which preceded the attachment).

Speaking

boldly, but respectfully, we defy counsel for intervenor or respondent
to point to any other credible documentary evidence in the record
which would overcome the conclusion above stated which we described
as inescapable, and which would require reversal of this judgment.
B.

THE CATTLE IN QUESTION WERE NOT RECEIVED BY MR. BOSWELL
AS AGENT FOR INTERVENOR.
Among the attached cattle the only animals which could

possibly have been received by Mr. BOSWELL as agent for intervenor
were 74 head representing the much-disputed shipments of December
15, 1972 and December 20, 1972. All other animals in question
were received by J.B.J, priot to those dates and, except for shipments of November 29 and December 12, were paid for!

Mr. BOSWELL

was at all times prior to January 1, 1973 an officer and agent
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for J.B.J., and intervenor doesn't even claim that BOSWELL acted
for intervenor prior to mid-December, 1972. Yet Boswell's own
list of J.B.J, animals included the December 15 and 20 shipments
as J.B.J, animals (Exhibit 33 and Tr. 424, 1.28).

The record con-

tains no evidence whatever that any of the other animals were
received by BOSWELL as agent for intervenor, and even the December
15 and 20 shipments are highly questionable.

It is clear that the

loads were purchased by intervenor or his order buyers in Montana
for sale to J.B.J, and were shipped to J.B.J, pursuant to standing
orders (Tr. 471, 1.21 and 499, 1.1). It was thought that new
financing for J.B.J, was pproved at the request of BOSWELL (Tr.
499, 1.25, et seq.), and that the cattle would be paid for by
J.B.J. (Tr. 500, 1.18).

Clearly BOSWELL was acting for J.B.J,

at those times and just as clearly, BOSWELL was acting for intervener after January 1, 1973 for the cattle specifically consigned
by MOUNT NEBO (Exhibit 86), but none of the cattle attached and
under review here were traceable to any of those MOUNT NEBO shipments.
C.

TITLE TO THE CATTLE PASSED TO J.B.J. FEEDYARDS.
In approaching the oral testimony

contained on the record,

it has never been necessary to attack the credibility of intervenor;
(his other chief witness, BOSWELL, was caught in a number of discrepancies, but even his best testimony was not fully supportive
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of intervener's position).

Mr. ALLEN was forthright and, when

he didn't know he said so, and when he was unsure, he admitted so.
His more positive statements were helpful to Appellant.

Of critical

importance to the issue of passage of title is Mr. ALLEN's testimony
regarding the effect of the "market clearances" from Montana as
"bills of sale".

He was unequivocal in describing Exhibits 39 and

40, for example, which detailed the December 15 and 20 shipments
totaling 74 head, as "bills of sale" (Tr. 556, 1.20 and 557, 1.20).
The standard practice in Montana was to consider those documents
as evidence of ownership of cattle (Tr. 530, 1.30).

Thus the 74

head mentioned in the December shipments should be construed as
owned by J.B.J, pursuant to the bills of sale, especially since
Mr. ALLEN admitted that Exhibit 33, BOSWELL's schedule of J.B.J,
cattle, represented all of the cattle purchases of J.B.J, through
December 20, 1972 (Tr. 504 and 505), irrespective of the nonpayment
of four loads which were billed to J.B.J. (Tr. 506, 11.8 and 15).
As to other loads of cattle designated for and shipped
to J.B.J., Exhibits 31 and 32 represent further livestock market
clearances which must operate as bills of sale.

These documents

further reflect the pattern of dealing by which bills of sale
were used in connection with shipments of cattle to J.B.J., including, we submit, those under consideration here, thus passing
title even before payment for the shipments was made or demanded.
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In other parts of the record, intervenor testified that
when cattle shipments were initiated by him from Montana to J.B.J.,
a draft drawn on one of the banks for J.B.J, was frequently (but
not always) made out and forwarded for collection.

The actual

shipment time for the cattle was 18-30 hours to Goshen, Utah, but
the drafts required eight or ten days for clearance (DON ALLEN
deposition pages 103, 105). In making such drafts on FIRST SECURITY,
he knew of FIRST SECURITY'S lien on the cattle (DON ALLEN deposition, page 134). These facts are typical of the dealings described
throughout all of the record by which the cattle arrived long
before any payment was expected.
shipments is entirely unwarranted.

Thus, any claim df "C.O.D."
Title passed to J.B.J, simply,

in accordance with business practices, and .as a matter of law.
The foregoing considerations, coupled with the additional
fact that nowhere in the record does intervenor claim he reserved
an express security interest in the shipped cattle pursuant to
Section 70A-9-203 or 70A-2-705, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
combine to demonstrate why this court should hold that no substantial
evidence appears for the conclusion of the lower court that title
did not pass from DON ALLEN to J.B.J.

On the contrary, we submit

affirmatively that the substantial evidence denotes the passage of
title to J.B.J, on all shipments.

How can intervenor deny the effect

of the bills of sale to J.B.J, which he or his order buyers caused
to be submitted in connection with each shipment from Montana to
J.B.J.?

He cannot and did not so deny, according to the record
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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before this Court*
II.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CLEAR POWER TO DISTURB FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT WHERE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT REASONABLY
AND CLEARLY SUPPORT SUCH FINDINGS.
It is unnecessary to engaged in semantical argument about the

difference between "substantial" evidence and "weight" of the
evidence.

We have attempted to demonstrate why the Court should

conclude that the key findings of the lower court were not supported by the record.

The legal proposition here is well accepted.

The Court has always recognized its inherent power to reverse and
set aside a lower court judgment where the findings are insufficient
or unsupported by the evidence, whether the case was tried to a
judge alone (Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 36 0.
20, 102 P. 631 (1909), or even to a jury (Seybold v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 121 U. 61, 239 P.2d 174 (1951).
CONCLUSION
Appellant petitions the Court to grant a rehearing in
the above-entitled case.

The bulk of the record (and even of

Appellant's first brief) perhaps obscured certain key issues and the
facts supporting or not supporting certain findings.

It is re-

spectfully submitted that a rehearing should result in alteration
of the Court's opinion when another, sharper focus on such key
facts is allowed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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